India’s nuclear gambit: Implications for regional and global stability

(Web Desk): South Asia is a region characterized by deep geopolitical rivalries. The recent years have seen an increasing threat of nuclear confrontation, making the area more unstable. Both Pakistan and India are nuclear-armed countries. Their management of arsenals differs significantly. Pakistan adheres to a doctrine of minimum credible deterrence, avoiding unnecessary escalation. In contrast, India takes a more aggressive and unpredictable stance by expanding its capabilities, making provocative statements, and displaying war jingoism and a lack of professionalism.

Pakistan’s nuclear program was driven more by fear than ambition. In 1974, India conducted its first atomic test, claiming it was for peaceful purposes. However, it soon emerged that India had used civilian nuclear technology supplied by other countries for military purposes. This event broke the trust of many nations and compelled Pakistan to develop its nuclear deterrent. As George Perkovich (1999) notes, this test marked a pivotal moment in South Asian security. Since then, Pakistan has maintained a defensive doctrine, primarily focused on India only. Its warheads are small and intended for deterrence; its missile ranges are designed to cover Indian territory; and it has voluntarily placed its civilian nuclear facilities under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). According to Kristensen and Korda (2021), Pakistan has modelled its nuclear command and control system on best global practices, conducting regular safety audits and implementing multi-layered checks.

India, however, has taken a different route. While its official stance still supports a “No First Use” (NFU) policy, several public statements by Indian leaders and recent developments suggest a potential shift in policy. India’s development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) such as Agni-V, with a range of 8,000 km, and the upcoming Agni-VI, projected to exceed 12,000 km, indicates a desire to project power well beyond its immediate neighbourhood. These are not weapons for regional deterrence, but are strategic tools aimed at major global powers. Additionally, many of India’s nuclear facilities operate outside comprehensive IAEA safeguards, raising concerns about the diversion of civilian fissile material for military use. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI, 2023), India continues to expand its unsafeguarded plutonium stockpile without committing to any verified fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT).

The actual dangers of India’s nuclear stance became clear in May 2025 during the Pakistan-India crisis. After a terrorist attack in Pahalgam on April 22, India launched Operation Sindoor from May 7 to 10. It was one of the most aggressive military actions in decades, involving strikes on multiple targets deep inside Pakistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir. India used BrahMos cruise missiles, SCALP missiles, and loitering drones, some of which are nuclear-capable. It was the most intense military exchange between the two countries. This significantly increased the risk of nuclear escalation. Analysts at RUSI and the Stimson Centre called this a clear example of “brinkmanship”. Pakistan had minimal time to decide whether the incoming BrahMos missile carried a nuclear warhead. The fear of a mistake was very real. Despite the seriousness of the situation, Pakistan avoided public nuclear threats; however, the exchange highlighted how close the region came to disaster.

In response, Pakistan launched Operation Bunyan-un-Marsoos on May 10, targeting twenty-six Indian military bases in retaliation. Although Pakistan’s goal was to send a message to India, in doing so, India pushed the limits of what could have escalated into a nuclear conflict. These operations highlighted the danger of using dual-use systems, missiles that can carry both conventional and nuclear warheads in normal military actions. When such weapons are used during a crisis, it becomes nearly impossible to tell whether the attack is part of a conventional or nuclear operation. That confusion can lead to panic and misjudgement, especially when time is limited.

The 2025 crisis was not the first time India acted recklessly with its nuclear assets. In March 2022, India accidentally fired a BrahMos missile into Pakistani territory, claiming it was due to a technical error (BBC, 2022). Luckily, there were no casualties, but the lack of accountability and transparency following the incident raised serious doubts about India’s operational discipline. Similarly, in 2021, Indian police arrested individuals trying to sell stolen uranium, prompting concerns about internal nuclear security (Al Jazeera, 2021). These incidents demonstrate that India’s nuclear command, control, and security systems are not as secure as they should be.

Even more concerning is the rhetoric from Indian politicians. During the 2019 Pulwama-Balakot crisis, Prime Minister Narendra Modi publicly called India’s “mother of nuclear bombs” and threatened Pakistan with massive retaliation (The Wire, 2019). In 2025, after Operation Sindoor, Modi again said that nuclear threats “will not stop India” from taking military action against terrorists. Such statements damage India’s responsible image and imply a willingness to involve nuclear weapons in political discussions, something no nuclear-armed country should take lightly.

In contrast, Pakistan has shown restraint. During and after Operation Sindoor, it avoided responding with nuclear threats, choosing instead to use conventional military force backed by diplomacy. Pakistan briefed international stakeholders and maintained secure command and control throughout the crisis. This consistent focus on deterrence rather than aggression shows that nuclear stability in South Asia is not a shared priority. Instead, it is something that Pakistan upholds while India continues to test its limits.

The way forward calls for significant changes. India should allow the IAEA to inspect all its civilian nuclear facilities to build global trust. There should also be formal agreements between India and Pakistan for crisis communication, including hotlines and early-warning systems. Both countries need to avoid deploying nuclear-capable systems during conventional military operations. India should reaffirm its commitment to the No First Use doctrine and participate in meaningful arms control discussions, especially regarding FMCT. The international community, particularly the United States, should take a more active role in fostering dialogue. President Donald Trump’s efforts during the 2019 and 2025 crises helped prevent war, but temporary diplomacy alone is not enough. A sustained push for long-term stability is essential.

In conclusion, Indian nuclear brinkmanship is a growing threat, not just to Pakistan but to the entire region and potentially the world. When countries with atomic weapons flirt with war, the consequences of even a small mistake can be devastating. South Asia cannot afford a nuclear miscalculation. Pakistan has demonstrated responsibility and maturity. It is now time for India to do the same, before another crisis spirals out of control.

Writer is Dr Abdul Rauf Iqbal

Courtesy to https://observerguardian.com/